I am just seriously tired of hearing about the same tired story of “correlationism this” and “correlationism that” when Heidegger himself explicitly claims that a conception of “correlation” cannot possibly capture the phenomenon of intentional comportment

I could not agree more. The label “correlationist” has taken hold (not just re: Heidegger) in part because Meillassoux’s beautiful book is so original that it feels like a breath of fresh air; when I read the accounts of Heidegger’s early career, especially Arendt’s memoir for him, and the reports of the Davos encounter between him and Cassirer, I get the impression that Heidegger must have seemed the same way to his own young contemporaries: a wholly new approach cutting a swathe through the ingrown thickets of academic philosophy. But the sober distance of 3/4 of a century enables us to see that Cassirer was not a fool either. “Correlationism” will turn out to be, like “decadence,” “onto-theology,” and “logocentrism,” just another swear-word, most of the time. This does not mean that Meillassoux is merely wrong–as is often noted, he (alone of the SRists?) credits correlationism w/ being worthy of a real immanent critique–but it does mean that using “correlationist” as a term of disapprobation and dismissal is bound, in the long run, to be shown up as an abdication of philosophy.

I have a response (including why one thinking about this ought to closely study the first two-thirds of Graham’s “Tool Being”) on my blog at http://drjon.typepad.com/jon_cogburns_blog/2010/02/brief-note-on-my-take-on-heidegger-and-realismantirealism-hat-tip-lee-braver-and-gary-williams.html . I look forward to seeing what you guys think.

I agree that the Meillassoux book is fantastic. I think his arguments actually work against John McDowell’s Wittgensteinian quietist moves, but I don’t know if I’m a good enough philosopher to make the case for this very well.

Tool Being is worth reading in general but it is a book that quickly leaves behind its Heideggerian background so it is hard to say. I’d get it on inter library loan if you can (it is very expensive at the moment) and have a look at the first two chapters and if you like what you see stick with it. On the other hand After Finitude is indispensible for this topic. Both myself and many other graduate Heideggerians are coming to this kind of mutual awareness of how we must deal with Meillassoux’s critique. It is also just generally an awesome book (short too and should be relatively cheap).

It is really exciting to have chosen my thesis topic on Heidegger. I’m taking a class on Being and Time this semester with Greg Schufreider and it has awoken my passion for Heidegger again. I’m thrilled that I get to dive back into Heidegger scholarship after doing so much cognitive science stuff lately. I already have a couple of Heidegger scholars lined up in my sights

Here’s a question though: how do you balance the ratio between lucid exegesis and critiquing other people’s interpretations? On one hand, I need to show that I have my own consistent interpretation of Heidegger, and on the other, I need to engage with the secondary literature. Btw, Jon Cogburn wants me to read Harman’s Tool-being, but I am not yet convinced that’s necessary; what do you think? I’m thinking After Finitude would be better to tackle if I want to address the issue of “correlationism”.

Good luck although I doubt you’ll need it.

Paul