Now I’ll be the first to admit I read Heidegger through a strong pragmatic lens (although pragmatism isn’t often what the received stereotype indicated: too many people come to it via Putnam or Rorty unfortunately). That pragmatism may bias how I read him. (And it was one of Sheehan’s categories although knowing the figures who are writing about pragmatism and Heidegger I don’t think I agree with their readings)

I guess my point is just that, like Sheehan, I think the texts are simpler than they often come off. And the complexity is partially due to the translations, partially due to how Heidegger writes, and primarily due to the larger Heideggarian community loving to play odd language games. Which is, I think, one of Sheehan’s points. (Of course I like Derrida a lot and he does the same thing at times, so take that for what its worth)

Anyway, I see Heidegger much more a philosopher of everyday experience, as you do. I think breaking the mysticism from the everyday is harder than you suggest though. While I disagreed with much of Caputo’s book on mysticism, I think he does a good job of explaining how mysticism and the everyday match up. (I don’t know if you’ve read that book)

So you feel that if Heideggerians were more keen to cash Heidegger’s philosophy out in terms of everyday phenomenological experience, his mysticism would abate? If that is indeed what you are saying, then I am in agreement. I often read secondary literature and I find myself thinking “example please?”. I think that if you can’t give a real-life example to illustrate Heidegger’s point, then you haven’t really grasped his phenomenology.

I think the biggest problem with far too many who deal with Heidegger is that they don’t just read Heidegger while doing phenomenology. I think if you do that then the word mysticism that seems to pop up all too often is avoided.